User-defined quantum key distribution by Li, Zhengyu et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
04
24
9v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
11
 M
ay
 20
18
User-defined quantum key distribution
Zhengyu Li1,2†, Yichen Zhang3†, and Hong Guo1∗
1State Key Laboratory of Advanced Optical Communication Systems and Networks,
School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Center for Quantum Information Technology,
Center for Computational Science and Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
2Central Research Institute, 2012 Labs, Huawei Technoligies Co., Ltd, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China
3State Key Laboratory of Information Photonics and Optical Communications,
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China and
†These authors contribute equally to this work.
(Dated: May 14, 2018)
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides secure keys resistant to code-breaking quantum computers. As
headed towards commercial application, it is crucial to guarantee the practical security of QKD systems. How-
ever, the difficulty of security proof limits the flexibility of protocol proposals, which may not fulfill with real
application requirements. Here we show a protocol design framework that allows one to securely construct
the protocol using arbitrary non-orthogonal states. Multi-mode entangled source is virtually introduced for the
security analysis, while coherent measurement is used to provide raw data. This ‘arbitrary’ feature reverses
the traditional protocol-decide-the-system working style, such that the protocol design now can follow what
the system generates. We show a valuable showcase, which not only solves the security challenge of discrete-
modulated coherent states, but also achieves high performance with no more than 256 coherent states. Our
findings lower the requirement for system venders with off-the-shell devices, thus will promote the commercial-
ization of QKD.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
BB84 protocol [1] started the era of quantum cryptography,
among which quantum key distribution (QKD) [2–4] is the
most applicable technology, providing physical-layer protec-
tion of information transmission through secure distribution
of private keys. For cost-effective implementation, a practi-
cal system usually carries out the prepare-and-measure (PM)
scheme of a QKD protocol, in which non-orthogonal states
are randomly prepared by Alice (the sender), and transmitted
to Bob (the receiver), who will measure the states with either
single-photon detection or coherent measurement (homodyne
or heterodyne detection) [5–8]. Systems with coherent de-
tectors are more attractive to commercial companies, due to
its room-temperature operation feature and the compatibility
with mature product chain of telecommunication. Protocols
with coherent measurement usually encode key information
on quadratures of a quantum optical state, which are usually
called continuous variable (CV) protocols [9–11].
The most influential CV protocol is GG02 protocol using
Gaussian modulated coherent states [6, 12]. It later evolves to
various Gaussian protocols [7, 8, 13] with theoretical security
proof [14–18], outperforming other CV protocols. To main-
tain the practical security [3] of a protocol running in a sys-
tem, the system should fulfill the theoretical assumptions in
security proof. However, even the most state-of-the-art com-
ponents cannot remove all the theory-experimentmismatches,
for instance, the continuous modulation of Gaussian protocols
can never be achieved with finite resolution digital-to-analog-
convertor (DAC) [19]. These mismatches also are one of the
motivations for the exploration of CV protocols using discrete
modulation [20–22], but their performances are not promis-
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ing as Gaussian protocols. Therefore, it’s desired for such a
protocol that it is adjustable according to practical systems.
Here we move one step forward, proposing a new CV pro-
tocol design framework, which allows one to construct the
protocol using arbitrary non-orthogonal states with rigorous
security analysis. Numerous protocols can be proposed by
choosing different non-orthogonal states, which can be dis-
cretely or continuously distributed, and can be pure or mixed.
This ‘arbitrary’ feature makes the protocol design can be cus-
tomized by any system vendor according to what they can ac-
tually manufacture.
The framework contains two duel schemes, one is the
PM scheme, and the other is the entanglement-based (EB)
scheme [23], which is the core design of our framework. The
main idea is that Alice uses multi-mode entangled state as
the source, and conducts positive-operator valued measures
(POVMs) and coherent measurements on different modes.
The results of POVMs correspond to the key information in
Alice’s side, and decide which state is sent out. The results
of coherent measurements are used to estimate the correlation
between Alice and Bob, through which the lower bound of the
secret key rate can be calculated.
Let us explain our framework using schematics in Fig. 1.
Due to finite resolution of devices, discrete modulation is al-
ways the case in practical applications, therefore we describe
our framework in discrete form. The PM scheme of our frame-
work is quite similar as a general QKD protocol. There are
n (≥ 2) different non-orthogonal states
{
ρ1
B0
, ρ2
B0
...ρn
B0
}
that Al-
ice could possibly send to Bob with non-zero probabilities
{p1, p2...pn}. For each time, which state will be sent is decided
by the first random number (a complex number or a vector)
generated by a quantum random number generator (QRNG).
Bob measures the received state ρB with coherent measure-
ment, and then they do the post-processing [24, 25]. The dif-
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FIG. 1. Schematics for EB and PM schemes of our framework.
(A) EB scheme. The entangled source is an N-mode state, among
which there are s (≥ 1) modes A1A2...As measured by some POVMs,
and other d (≥ 1) modes C1C2...Cd will be measured by heterodyne
detectors. Mode B0 is sent to Bob. (B) PM scheme. The state gener-
ation is accomplished by modulating the light source, followed with
a strong attention. The modulation is controlled by the first ran-
dom number (or a random vector) which can be acquired through a
QRNG. The second sequence is decided by the first random number.
Bob’s measurement can be either homodyne (Hom) or heterodyne
(Het) detection. Att: Attenuator. LO: Local oscillator. Vac: Vacuum.
Hom-x(p): homodyne detection for x(p) quadrature.
ference is, Alice additionally needs a second sequence for the
security analysis (see explanation later).
The equivalence of the EB scheme lies in the design of
Alice’s entangled source and measurements. The entangled
source
∣∣∣ψACB0〉 is an N-mode purification of the mixed state
ρB0 =
∑n
i=1 piρ
i
B0
, in which the subscriptA represents s modes
A1A2...As, C represents d modes C1C2...Cd, and s + d + 1 =
N, s ≥ 1, d ≥ 1. Alice keeps modes A and C, while sends
mode B0 to Bob. The measurements for modesA are POVMs,
with the results recorded as MA = (m1,m2, ...ms); and the
measurements for modes C are heterodyne measurements,
with the results recorded as HC = (h1, h2...hd). We require
that these measurements will project mode B0 onto a state
ρ
MA ,HC
B0
∈
{
ρ1
B0
, ρ2
B0
...ρn
B0
}
. After sending the state ρ
MA,HC
B0
to
Bob, the rest are the same as the PM scheme.
To show the validity of our framework for arbitrary non-
orthogonal states, we first give a sufficient condition to find
such an N-mode purification. It is that which state is sent to
Bob is only decided by the POVMs results MA. This means
the sub-state of modes C and B0 conditioned on the results
MA is a product state, ρ
MA
CB0
= ρ
MA
C
⊗ ρMA
B0
. Then among the
purifications of such mixed state ρCB0 =
∑n
i=1 piρ
i
C
⊗ ρi
B0
, the
entangled source
∣∣∣ψACB0〉 and the corresponding POVMs for
modes A can always be found. This sub-state product feature
is also the necessary condition if the non-orthogonal states are
coherent states.
Second, we explain how to calculate the secret key rate.
Here we restrict to the reverse reconciliation and asymptotic
case [12, 26], which is the base for other cases. The key part
is to evaluate the Holevo information [27] S (HB : E) between
Bob’s data and the quantum adversary, whose upper bound
SG
BE
can be got through the covariance matrix γACB thanks to
the Gaussian state extramelity theorem [15, 28]. However, the
POVMs for modes A make γACB incomplete. More specifi-
cally, if γACB is expressed in the form of several sub-matrices,
γACB =

γA φAC κAB
φT
AC
γC φCB
κT
AB
φT
CB
γB
 (1)
then the covariance term κAB is unknown. For other terms,
γA, γC, and φAC can be theoretically calculated, and φCB, γB
can be estimated through the measured data. Now SG
BE
be-
comes a function of an unknown variable κAB. Nevertheless,
the uncertainty principle puts a constraint on the covariance
matrix of a physical state [10], which limits the possible value
of κAB to a set S κ. If we denote φ
Eve
AB
as the real eavesdropping
induced κAB, then φ
Eve
AB
∈ S κ. Therefore, by finding the max-
imum SG
BE
(κAB) through traversing the set S κ, we can define
the secret key rate as
KR = βI (MA : HB) − sup
κAB∈S κ
SGBE (κAB) , (2)
where I (MA : HB) is the classical mutual information, and β
is the reconciliation efficiency.
Now we can explain what the second sequence in the PM
scheme is. Originally, it should be the measurements results
HC, which can be simulated by a QRNG since all modesC are
kept in Alice’s side. If further exploiting the product feature
of ρ
MA
CB0
, the estimation of φCB requires only the mean values
of quadratures for the sub-state ρ
MA
C
. Then a simpler form of
the second sequence is
{
x¯
MA
C1
, p¯
MA
C1
, ..., x¯
MA
Cd
, p¯
MA
Cd
}
, where x¯
MA
Ci
=
TrC
(
xˆCiρ
MA
C
)
, and p¯
MA
Ci
= TrC
(
pˆCiρ
MA
C
)
. This simple form can
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FIG. 2. State preparation calibration. In a coherent-state system,
to check what state is really generated, a beamsplitter (BS) is inserted
between the modulator and the attenuator. One output of the BS
will be measured by a heterodyne detector (Het). The measurement
result will be sampled and sent to the processor (used for system
control and post-processing), in which the relationship between the
data and the modulation result is processed. ADC: Analog-to-Digital
Convertor.
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FIG. 3. The specific three-mode protocol for coherent states. The
three-mode entangled source is acquired through a two-mode entan-
gled state |ψAD〉. Mode D interacts with the vacuum on a beamsplit-
ter, then the two output modes are C and B0.
be realized digitally in the processer, since it’s decided by the
first random number, not independently random. Therefore,
the PM scheme has no change in hardware comparing to the
existing CV-QKD system.
System vendors, as the direct user of protocols, used to
build the system following the instruction of a protocol. Now
in contrast to this tradition, the protocol can be customized
following a practical system. A vendor can start with checking
what states their system can generate, then set the probability
of sending each state. For the rest, one can follow our frame-
work to find a proper N-mode purification, and the secret key
rate formula can be got.
Protocols using coherent states are usually the choice of
vendors due to the low-cost laser source. The state is gener-
ated by modulating the laser with an intensity modulator (IM)
and a phase modulator (PM) or a quadrature-phase shift key-
ing (QPSK) modulator, followed by a strong attention. Such
modulation using off-the-shell devices usually suffers prob-
lems as discretization, non-linearity and noise. To check what
the state is actually generated, one can use an additional mea-
surement structure, shown in Fig. 2. The modulated light
passes a beamsplitter before entering the attenuator, and a
large portion of it goes to a heterodyne detector. Then the
modulation result can be read-out with high signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR), since the noise figure of classical detectors per-
forms well in the bandwidth of a QKD system (usually less
than 1GHz). This step can be a pre-calibration procedure, or
a continuous feedback during the whole running time. Once
the map between Alice’s data and its real modulation result is
set up, it can also be used to compensate the modulation error.
Only small deviation remains.
We found an effective way to build the EB scheme for the
case using coherent states. We choose three-mode entangled
source
∣∣∣ψACB0〉 for simplicity, and our design principle is to
maximize the correlation between modesC and B0, which can
limit the eavesdropper. This leads to the choice for each ρi
C
that it’s also a coherent state
∣∣∣αi
C
〉
with the mean value linearly
dependent on
∣∣∣αi
B0
〉
. Following this way, one only needs to
find a two-mode entangled state |ψAD〉, then mode D passing
a beamsplitter will result in the
∣∣∣ψACB0〉, as shown in Fig. 3.
To achieve the same high performance as ideal Gaussian
protocols, our framework can reduce the necessary number
of used coherent states to no more than 256. Comparing
to generating around 1 million coherent states in Gaussian
protocols, requested to suppress the theory-experiment mis-
match [19], this will greatly reduce the complexity of state
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FIG. 4. Secret key rates and tolerable excess noises. (A) Secret key
rate for low channel noise case (ǫC = 0.01). (B) Secret key rate for
high channel noise case (ǫC = 0.05). (C) Tolerable excess noise. The
black solid line represents the ideal Gaussian case, the blue dash-
dotted line represents 16-QAM case, the red dotted line represents
64-QAM case, the yellow dashed line represents 256-QAM case.
Simulation details are explained in the supplementary information.
preparation. Now only 4-bits resolution for each quadrature’s
modulation is required, which means the modulation noise is
negligible, considering the fact that the equivalent-number-of-
bit (ENOB) for an off-the-shell DAC can usually reach higher
than 10 bits. Different constellation of
∣∣∣αi
B0
〉
will influence the
protocol’s performance. We show some performance simu-
lations of standard quadrature-amplitude-modulation (QAM)
with different number of states in Fig. 4, which is commonly
used constellation in classical telecommunication. One can
find that with proper settings, 256-QAM can reach the per-
formance almost the same as ideal Gaussian case. And for
the low noise case, the number of coherent states can be
further reduced to 64, or even lower as 16 for short range.
Small-deviation non-standard QAMs, which may happen due
to the uncompensated modulation non-linearity, have the sim-
ilar performances.
4Other constellation maps can also be introduced, and run
on the same hardware. The switch among pre-set or freshly
user-defined constellation maps can be actively controlled by
customers, through software-defined manner. This complies
the trend of telecommunication network. Combined with the
simple modulation and allowance for using off-the-shell de-
vices, our framework will promote the commercialization of
QKD.
We thank C. Su, L. Lu, Y. Zou, Y. Cai and B. Xu for
discussions. This work was supported by the National
Natural Science Foundation under Grant 61531003.
APPENDIX A: SECRET KEY RATE
Here we explain our derivation of the secret key rate for-
mula. The state-of-the-art security analysis method is de-
riving the secret key length formula in the finite-size regime
under the universal composable framework (UCF) [16–18].
First, one needs to reduce the full formula (quantized by the
smooth min-entropy) to a lower bound, which usually is the
asymptotic secret key rate with modification terms related to
the block size. Then derive a lower bound of the asymptotic
secret key rate, which should be calculable through only the
measured data. The first reduction relies on several theoretical
theorems, differing for different entangled states and measure-
ments used in the protocol, and this is an open question for our
framework. Therefore, here we focus on the asymptotic secret
key rate formula, and discuss the reverse reconciliation case.
A generally used secret key rate for the asymptotic case is
the Devetak-Winter formula [26],
K = βI (MA : HB) − S (HB : E) , (3)
where I (MA : HB) is the classical mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob, β is the classical reconciliation ef-
ficiency, and S (HB : E) is the Holevo information between
Bob’s data and the adversary [27]. Usually, S (HB : E) can be
replaced by any of its upper bounds S¯ (HB : E), among which
the Gaussian state extramelity theorem [15, 28] induced up-
per bound SG
BE
is the most commonly used case. Because its
calculation only relies on the covariance matrix γACB, which
can be estimated through the experimental data.
The covariance matrix γ of a N-mode state ρˆN is defined
as [10],
γi j :=
1
2
〈{
∆rˆi,∆rˆ j
}〉
, (4)
where rˆ = {xˆ1, pˆ1, ..., xˆN , pˆN }, 〈rˆi〉 = Tr (rˆiρˆN), and ∆rˆi =
rˆi − 〈rˆi〉. Suppose γACB is the covariance matrix of the state
ρACB, which is the state after mode B0 of the entangled source∣∣∣ψACB0〉 arriving at Bob’s side through the channel. It can be
represented using several sub-matrices,
γACB =

γA φAC κAB
φT
AC
γC φCB
κT
AB
φT
CB
γB
 (5)
where γA, γC and γB are covariance matrices for modes A, C
and B, and φAC, φCB and κAB are covariance terms between
different modes.
Among all these sub-matrices, γA, γC and φAC can be di-
rectly calculated from
∣∣∣ψACB0〉, since modes A and C are kept
in Alice’s side. φCB and γB can be estimated after Alice and
Bob randomly sharing part of their coherent measurement re-
sults. The only unknown sub-matrix is κAB, since the mea-
surements for modes A are not coherent measurements now.
Nevertheless, the covariance matrix γN for a N-mode state
is constrained by the uncertainty principle [10], which is
γN + iΩN ≥ 0, (6)
where ΩN = diag (ω1, ω2, ..., ωN), and
ω1 = ... = ωN = ω =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (7)
We denote S
ψ
κ as the set of all κAB satisfying this constraint for
γACB, which is
S
ψ
κ =
{
φAB| γACB
[
κAB = φAB
]
+ iΩN ≥ 0
}
. (8)
If φEve
AB
is the real eavesdropping induced κAB, then φ
Eve
AB
∈ S ψκ .
It can be understood that SG
BE
is a function of κAB now. Then
by traversing the set S
ψ
κ for all possible κAB, we can find the
maximum of SG
BE
. Then the secret key rate can be wrote as
KR = βI (MA : HB) − sup
κAB∈S ψκ
SGBE (κAB) . (9)
Next we briefly introduce the calculation method for each
term. For βI (MA : HB), it can be expressed as βI (MA : HB) =
H (HB) − leakEC , in which H (HB) is the Shannon entropy
of Bob’s measurement results, and leakEC represents the in-
formation that Bob sends to Alice for the data reconcilia-
tion. Both these terms can be got from measured data and
the error correction step. The reason that we usually sepa-
rate βI (MA : HB) into β and I (MA : HB) in theoretical study
is this helps numerical simulation, which is used to evaluate
the performance of a protocol. Given the channel model (usu-
ally required to fit the experimental environment), the proba-
bility p (HB|i) can be got from the model, which is the prob-
ability of getting Bob’s measurement result HB given Alice
sending the state ρi
B0
. And the overall probability will be
p (HB) =
∑n
i=1 pip (HB|i). If HB is a discrete variable quan-
tized from the measurement result, then
I (MA : HB)
= −∑
HB
p (HB) log2p (HB) +
n∑
i=1
pi
∑
HB
p (HB|i) log2p (HB|i).
(10)
If consider HB as the continuous variable for some theoreti-
cal research, the sum of HB will be replaced by integration.
The reconciliation efficiency β can be set according to cer-
tain error correction code, for instance, 0.95 is achievable
for multi-dimensional reconciliation method in low signal-to-
noise regime [29].
5For sup
κAB∈S ψκ S
G
BE
(κAB), we traverse each κAB ∈ S ψκ to
calculate its corresponding SG
BE
(κAB) and find the maximal
value of them. SG
BE
(κAB) can be expressed as S
(
ρG
ACB
|κAB
)
−
S
(
ρG
AC|B|κAB
)
, in which S
(
ρG
ACB
|κAB
)
means the von Neumann
entropy of a Gaussian state ρG
ACB
which has the same co-
variance matrix as γACB (κAB), and S
(
ρG
AC|B|κAB
)
means the
von Neumann entropy of a conditional Gaussian state ρG
AC|HB
which has the same covariance matrix as γAC|HB , related to
Bob’s measurement method. The methods to get the γAC|HB
from γACB, to get the symplectic eigenvalues of each co-
variance matrix, and to calculate the von Neumann entropy
are commonly used in CV-QKD, and can be found in refer-
ence [10, 15].
APPENDIX B: THE SIMPLE FORM OF THE SECOND
SEQUENCE
In the covariance matrix γACB, γA, γC and φAC can be theo-
retically calculated, and γB is estimated only using Bob’s data.
Only the estimation of φCB will use the measurement results of
modes C. Naturally, the second sequence should be the mea-
surement results HC for modes C, which can be simulated
through a quantum random number generator (QRNG). How-
ever, the product feature of sub-state ρi
CB0
can help to simplify
this.
Let’s take the x-quadrature of mode C1 as an example. Af-
ter tracing out the other modes of C, the state of modes C1
and B0 is ρC1B0 =
∑n
i=1 piρ
i
C1
⊗ ρi
B0
, where ρi
C1
= TrC2...Cs
(
ρi
C
)
.
Then
〈
∆xˆC1∆xˆB0
〉
=
n∑
i=1
piTrC1B0
[(
xˆC1 − x¯C1
) (
xˆB0 − x¯B0
)
ρiC1 ⊗ ρiB0
]
=
n∑
i=1
pi
(
x¯iC1 − x¯C1
) (
x¯iB0 − x¯B0
)
, (11)
in which each x¯i
C1
= TrC1
(
xˆC1ρ
i
C1
)
and x¯C1 =
∑n
i=1 pi x¯
i
C1
can be
theoretically calculated. Therefore, if the first random number
decides that ρi
B0
will be sent, then it’s enough to let the second
sequence be
{
x¯i
C1
, p¯i
C1
, ..., x¯i
Cd
, p¯i
Cd
}
for the calculation of φCB.
This is much simpler than simulating the heterodyne results
HC using quantum random numbers.
APPENDIX C: THE PRODUCT FEATURE OF SUB-STATE
ρ
MA
CB0
IS NECESSARY
The EB scheme plays the key role in our framework, in
which we need to find a proper entangled source and the mea-
surements in Alice’s side. Here we explain one detail of our
design solution. Consider the case that one wants to use fi-
nite discrete-distributed coherent states as the non-orthogonal
source, which is the most significant case for practical im-
plementation. In this case, it is necessary to require that the
sub-state ρ
MA
CB0
of modes C and B0 conditioned on the POVMs
results MA is a product state.
To explain this necessity, we first prove a lemma which is
Lemma 1. For any two-mode entangled state ρAB, if after
the heterodyne detection over mode A, mode B is projected
onto a coherent state, then the number of possibly projected
coherent states for mode B is either one or infinite.
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose ρAB satisfies that
mode B is a coherent state after the heterodyne detection over
mode A, and the number n of the possibly projected coherent
state is∞ > n ≥ 2.
For generality, we assume ρAB is a mixed state. There ex-
ists a purification of ρAB, which can be expressed as ρFAB =∑n
i=1
√
pi
∣∣∣φi
FA
〉 ∣∣∣αi
B
〉
. The heterodyne detection can be seen as
the projection onto a coherent state |αA〉. We divide the overall
phase space for mode A into n+ 1 different sets {ς1, ς2...ςn+1},
among which any two of them has no overlap. This equals to
divide the two-dimensional plane into n+1 points sets without
overlap. The first n sets correspond to the n different output
coherent states of mode B. For example, for the heterodyne
measurement result αA, if αA ∈ ςi, then mode B will be pro-
jected onto
∣∣∣αi
B
〉
. And we assume for each element of the first
n sets, the probability of getting a corresponding heterodyne
result for mode A is non-zero. The last set ςn+1 corresponds
to the points that will never be the heterodyne result, which
means TrB
[〈αA| ρAB |αA〉] = 0, if αA ∈ ςn+1.
Suppose 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and αA ∈ ςk, then we know
∣∣∣αkB〉 〈αkB∣∣∣ =
∑nn
i j=11
Ci j
∣∣∣αiB〉 〈α jB
∣∣∣∣ , (12)
whereCi j =
(√
pip j
/
p (αA)
)
·TrF
[〈
αA
∣∣∣ φi
FA
〉 〈
φ
j
FA
∣∣∣∣ αA
〉]
, and
p (αA) is the probability of getting the measurement result αA.
First, we can prove that if i , k or j , k, then Ci j = 0,
which means the only non-zero term is Ckk = 1. The intuitive
understanding of this is that, there are infinite equations con-
straining finite variables Ci j. The detailed proof can follow
these steps:
1) derive D
(
−αk
B
) ∣∣∣αk
B
〉 〈
αk
B
∣∣∣D† (−αk
B
)
, and move the vac-
uum state term to one side,
(1 − Ckk) |0〉 〈0| =
∑nn
i j=11,i j,kk
Ci j
∣∣∣αiB − αkB〉 〈α jB − αkB
∣∣∣∣ .
(13)
2) calculate the inner product between the Fock state |t〉 and
the vacuum state,
0 =
∑nn
i j=11,i j,kk
Ci je
−|βi|2/2e
−|β j|2
/
2
βtiβ
∗t
j
/
t!, ∀t ≥ 1, (14)
where βi = α
i
B
− αk
B
, β j = α
j
B
− αk
B
.
If let λi j = βiβ
∗
j
, di j = Ci j exp
[
−
(
|βi|2 +
∣∣∣β j∣∣∣2
)/
2
]
, then the
first n2 − 1 equations can be written in the matrix formula
ΛD = 0, in which Λ is the transport of a Vandermonde matrix
with n2−1 different non-zero λi j, and D is a vector with n2−1
different di j. Since the Vandermonde matrix has the feature of
full rank, then the above equations have the only solution that
each di j = 0, which means ∀i j , kk,Ci j = 0, and Ckk = 1.
6Second, for any ςk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 1, we can define
a corresponding set τk of coherent states, which is τk =
{|αA〉 | if αA ∈ ςk}. Then the above discussion will lead to the
conclusion that, for each τk, there exists at least one state or-
thogonal to it. First look at the case 1 ≤ k ≤ n, in which Cii =
0 for any i = j , k. This means ∀ |αA〉 ∈ τk, 〈αA| ρiiA |αA〉 = 0,
where ρii
A
= TrF
[∣∣∣φi
FA
〉 〈
φi
FA
∣∣∣]. Then ρii
A
is orthogonal to the set
τk. Second, for the case k = n+1, from its definition we know
TrB
[〈αA | ρAB |αA〉] = 0, if |αA〉 ∈ ςn+1. Then ρA = TrB [ρAB] is
orthogonal to τn+1.
However, it can be proved that when n is finite, among all
these n+1 set {τ1, τ2...τn+1}, at least there is one of them being
a complete or over-complete set of the Fock state space [30],
which means no state can be orthogonal to this set. This is
contradictory to the previous conclusion. Therefore, for the
case ∞ > n ≥ 2, no such a two-mode entangled state can be
found. 
One can easily generalize this to the N-mode entangled
state case, which is, for any N-mode entangled state ρAB, if
after the heterodyne detections for each mode of A, mode B
is projected onto a coherent state, then the number of possibly
projected coherent states for mode B is either one or infinite.
For our EB scheme, after the POVMs for modes A, the
conditioned sub-state ρ
MA
CB0
will face the same situation as the
above argument. And what we consider is the finite coherent
states case, then the number of possibly projected coherent
states for mode B0 is only one. This means ρ
MA
CB0
is a product
state that ρ
MA
CB0
= ρ
MA
C
⊗
∣∣∣∣αMAB0
〉 〈
α
MA
B0
∣∣∣∣.
The above conclusion shows four facts about our frame-
work: 1) POVM measurements other than heterodyne detec-
tion should be introduced; 2) entangled state with more than
two modes are necessary; 3) after the POVMs, the conditioned
sub-state should be a product state; 4) which coherent state
will be sent to Bob is decided by the results of POVMs.
APPENDIX D: THREE-MODE PROTOCOL FOR FINITE
DISCRETE-DISTRIBUTED COHERENT STATES
For a CV system, generating discrete-distributed coherent
states is the most practical case, because of the finite resolu-
tion for practical devices. The successful application of our
framework to this case improves the practical security of CV
systems.
Here we will explain some details of our design principle
for the discrete-distributed coherent states case. The three-
mode entangled source model we use is not only simple-
structure, but also highly effective.
A. Two-mode entangled source
Suppose the source states are n different coherent states
S ρ =
{∣∣∣α1
B0
〉
,
∣∣∣α2
B0
〉
...
∣∣∣αn
B0
〉}
, and the three-mode entangled
source is
∣∣∣ψACB0〉. From the discussion of section II. B we
know that, the performance of a protocol is mainly decided
by the structure of ρCB0 . Therefore, our design principle is to
let the correlation between modes C and B0 as ‘high’ as pos-
sible, which from the covariance matrix pointview we want∣∣∣〈∆xˆC∆xˆB0〉∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣〈∆pˆC∆pˆB0〉∣∣∣ to be as large as possible. We
note that our design principle is only an example inspired by
the experience, and it works well for the quadrature-amplitude
modulation (QAM) case. Other design solutions for different
modulation cases also worth further investigations.
Suppose the covariance matrix γACB0 for
∣∣∣ψACB0〉 is of the
standard form [31, 32], which means all
〈
∆xˆi∆pˆ j
〉
= 0,∀i, j.
This can be achieved in the QAM case.
We take x-quadure as the example. Denote the mean and
the variance of each sub-state ρi
C
and
∣∣∣αi
B0
〉
as
x¯i
C
= TrC
(
xˆCρ
i
C
)
,V i
C,x
= TrC
(
xˆ2
C
ρi
C
)
−
(
x¯i
C
)2
,
x¯i
B0
=
〈
αi
B0
∣∣∣ xˆB0 ∣∣∣αiB0
〉
,V i
B0,x
= 1.
(15)
Then the overall mean values of modes C and B0 are x¯C =∑n
i=1 pi x¯
i
C
, x¯B0 =
∑n
i=1 pi x¯
i
B0
, and the variances are
VC,x =
n∑
i=1
piV
i
C,x
+
n∑
i=1
pi
(
x¯i
C
− x¯C
)2
,
VB0,x = 1 +
n∑
i=1
pi
(
x¯i
B0
− x¯B0
)2
.
(16)
Now look at
∣∣∣〈∆xˆC∆xˆB0〉∣∣∣, which is∣∣∣〈∆xˆC∆xˆB0〉∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣〈(xˆC − x¯C) (xˆB0 − x¯B0)〉∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
piTrCB0
[
(xˆC − x¯C)
(
xˆB0 − x¯B0
)
ρiC ⊗ ρiB0
]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
pi
(
x¯iC − x¯C
) (
x¯iB0 − x¯B0
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
√
n∑
i=1
pi
(
x¯i
C
− x¯C
)2

n∑
i=1
pi
(
x¯i
B0
− x¯B0
)2
=
√VC,x −
n∑
i=1
piV
i
C,x
 (VB0,x − 1). (17)
The inequality is due to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
ity, in which the equality holds if and only if ∀i ∈
[1, n] ,
(
x¯i
C
− x¯C
)/(
x¯i
B0
− x¯B0
)
≡ t, where t is non-zero. The un-
certainty principle tells that for each sub-state, V i
C,x
V i
C,p
≥ 1.
If we further assume that x and p are symmetric for each sub-
state, then V i
C,x
≥ 1, and ∑ni=1 piV iC,x ≥ 1. Thus, to achieve
the maximum
∣∣∣〈∆xˆC∆xˆB0〉∣∣∣, we need V iC,x = 1. One can find
that these two conditions can be both satisfied if each ρi
C
is
also a coherent state
∣∣∣αi
C
〉
, with the mean value linearly de-
pendent on
∣∣∣αi
B0
〉
, which is ∀i ∈ [1, n] , αi
C
/
αi
B0
= t. This linear
relationship can be got from a beamsplitter model, which is
a coherent state
∣∣∣βi
D
〉
with βi
D
=
√
1 + t2αi
B0
passes through
a beamsplitter with transmittance ηBS = 1
/(
1 + t2
)
. This
means Alice only needs to generate a two-mode entangled
state |ψAD〉 =
∑n
i=1
√
pi
∣∣∣Ri
A
〉 ∣∣∣βi
D
〉
, and then let the mode D
7pass through a beamsplitter, shown as Fig. 2 in the main con-
text.
As for the design of |ψAD〉, first, we find a set of orthogonal
states
{∣∣∣θi
D
〉
=
∑∞
j=0 ci j | j〉
}
, which can diagonalize the mixed
state ρD, such that
ρD =
∑n
i=1
pi
∣∣∣βiD〉 〈βiD∣∣∣ =
∑n
i=1
υi
∣∣∣θiD〉 〈θiD∣∣∣ (18)
Then |ψAD〉 is defined as
|ψAD〉 =
∑n
i=1
√
υi
∣∣∣ϕiA〉 ∣∣∣θiD〉 , (19)
where
∣∣∣ϕi
A
〉
is related to
∣∣∣θi
D
〉
in such a way,
∣∣∣ϕiA〉 =
∑∞
j=0
(
ci j
)∗ | j〉. (20)
B. Quadrature-amplitude modulation (QAM)
We are especially interested in the QAM case, because it’s a
standard modulation format in the classical coherent commu-
nication. Systems running such a modulation format is natu-
rally compatible with current industry chain of electro-optical
devices.
In n-QAM (n = L2, L) is positive integer), coherent states
are positioned at the cross points of equally-spaced L columns
and L rows in the phase space (or classically called constella-
tion map). Suppose the space between each column (or row)
is 2r, then the positions of n coherent states are{
∀µ, υ ∈ [1, L] , αµυ = (2µ − 1 − L) r + i · (2υ − 1 − L) r
}
It can be verified that for this standard QAM format, the co-
variance matrix for |ψAD〉 is of the standard form,
γAD =
(
VAI φADσZ
φADσZ VAI
)
(21)
where I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, and σZ =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. We know that
φAD ≤
√
V2
A
− 1 due to the uncertainty principle, and the
closer φAD approaches to
√
V2
A
− 1, the better the protocol per-
formance will be. Thus, for the n-QAM, we need to choose
the proper sending probabilities {p1, ..., pn} and the space pa-
rameter r to make the φAD as large as possible. Since the dif-
ferent {p1, ..., pn} and rwill result in differentVA, we introduce
a dimensionless parameter ηA = φ
2
AD
/(
V2
A
− 1
)
to evaluate the
closeness of φAD to
√
V2
A
− 1 for the small VA region.
Fully optimization of the probabilities {p1, ..., pn} is com-
plicated. Here we let them follow a discrete Gaussian distri-
bution: let r0 = 1 (the unit is the square root of the shot noise
unit (SNU)), then the probability p
(
αµυ
)
of sending the state∣∣∣αµυ〉 is
p
(
αµυ
)
∝ exp
[
−
∣∣∣αµυ (r = r0)∣∣∣2
/
(2VG)
]
. (22)
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FIG. 5. 1 − ηA versus VA. (A) 16-QAM case, curves following the
direction of the arrow (left side bottom-up) correspond to the cases of
VG = 2.0 ∼ 6.0. (B) 64-QAM case, curves following the direction of
the arrow (left side bottom-up) correspond to the cases of VG = 5 ∼
15. (C) 256-QAM case, curves following the direction of the arrow
(right side top-down) correspond to the cases of VG = 5 ∼ 15. We
mark the optimal VG and the corresponding 1 − ηA for two different
conditions VA = 3 and VA = 5.
8This simplifies the probability distribution to only one param-
eter VG.
We numerically calculate the ηA for 16-QAM, 64-QAMand
256-QAM, with different VG and r, to find a relatively optimal
combination of VA and ηA. Generally speaking, for the small
VA region, the larger the VA is, the worse the ηA is. Fig. 5
shows our simulation result. For 16-QAM (Fig. 5(A)), when
VA = 3, the optimal choice for VG is VG = 3, which corre-
sponds to ηA ≈ 1−3.7×10−3; when VA = 5, the optimal choice
for VG is VG = 4.5, which corresponds to ηA ≈ 1 − 1 × 10−2.
For 64-QAM (Fig. 5(B)), when VA = 3, the optimal choice for
VG is VG = 5, which corresponds to ηA ≈ 1 − 2.4 × 10−5; and
when VA = 5, the optimal choice for VG is VG = 6, which cor-
responds to ηA ≈ 1 − 1.4 × 10−4. For 256-QAM (Fig. 5(C)),
when VA = 3, the optimal choice for VG is VG = 8, which
corresponds to ηA ≈ 1 − 8.2 × 10−10; and when VA = 5,
the optimal choice for VG is VG = 11, which corresponds to
ηA ≈ 1 − 6.5 × 10−8.
From the ηA-pointview, 256-QAM is almost the ideal Gaus-
sian case, and such a small deviation won’t cause a large per-
formance reduction. This is verified by the secret key rate
simulation shown in the Fig. 3 of the main context.
In experiment, the two quadratures can be modulated sepa-
rately, for instance using the QPSK modulator. Thus, for the
L2-QAM, the resolution of the DAC device for the modulation
of one quadrature is res = log2L. Then for 16-QAM, res = 2,
64-QAM, res = 3, and for 256-QAM, res = 4. DAC devices
with such resolutions are off-the-shell and cost-effective.
C. Techniques for the numerical calculation
Numerical calculation is needed in two parts, in which the
first is the calculation of γA, γC and φAC , and the second is the
searching process.
For the calculation of γA, γC and φAC , a simple way is to
express every state, e.g.
∣∣∣αi
B0
〉
,
∣∣∣θi
D
〉
and
∣∣∣φi
D
〉
, in the Fock state
basis, and then finish the calculation. One thing needs to be
careful with is, to achieve high precision, the number of Fock
state bases should be greatly larger than
√
VA. For example,
for VA = 10, we choose first 200 Fock states to express a state.
This numerical method fits well with the theoretical results for
the 4-QAM case in [22].
For the searching process, although the three-mode entan-
gled state model already has the least unknown parameters,
the symmetry of the QAM case can further simplify it.
First, we define the standard form of the covariance matrix
for the three-mode EB scheme for L2-QAM. After Bob shar-
ing part of his measurement results, the sub covariance matrix
γCB of modesC and B can be transformed to the standard form
γstd
CB
[31, 32], which is
γstdCB =

[
(1 − ηBS ) (VA − 1) + 1
]
I
(
φx 0
0 φp
)
(
φx 0
0 φp
)
VBI
 , (23)
through two local unitary operators over modes C and B with
corresponding symplectic matrices SC and S B. φx and φp may
not be equal. Then one can find a unitary operator over mode
A with the corresponding symplectic matrix S A, such that
S AσZS
T
C
= σZ . Therefore, the covariance matrix γACB can
be ‘standardized’ by these three operators S = S A ⊕ SC ⊕ S B :
γstd
ACB
= S γACBS
T =

VAI −
√
(1 − ηBS ) ηA
(
V2
A
− 1
)
σZ κ
′
AB
−
√
(1 − ηBS ) ηA
(
V2
A
− 1
)
σZ
[
(1 − ηBS ) (VA − 1) + 1
]
I
(
φx 0
0 φp
)
κ′
AB
(
φx 0
0 φp
)
VBI

(24)
where κ′
AB
= S AκABS
T
B
=
(
κ11 κ12
κ21 κ22
)
is still unknown.
For this standard form, it is found that, no matter Bob uses
heterodyne or homodyne detection, the secret key rate for the
case γstd
ACB
(κ11, κ12, κ21, κ22) (denote this state as ρ
(+)
ACB
) and the
case γstd
ACB
(κ11,−κ12,−κ21, κ22) (denote this state as ρ(−)ACB) are
the same. If we further define a state as the equally mix-
ture of the above two cases, ρmix =
(
ρ
(+)
ACB
+ ρ
(−)
ACB
)/
2, then
its covariance matrix will be γstd
ACB
(κ11, 0, 0, κ22). And from
the sub-additivity of the secret key rate, we know K (ρmix) ≤(
K
(
ρ
(+)
ACB
)
+ K
(
ρ
(−)
ACB
))/
2 = K
(
ρ
(+)
ACB
)
. Therefore, the lowest
secret key rate case must happen at the condition κ12 = κ21 =
0. This further simplifies the searching process to two un-
known parameters κ11 and κ22.
When κ12 = κ21 = 0, it is found that the secret key rate is un-
changed when
(
κ11, κ22, φx, φp
)
becomes
(
−κ22,−κ11, φp, φx
)
.
This means, if φx = φp, the lowest secret key rate happens
at the condition κ11 + κ22 = 0, which further simplifies the
searching process to only one unknown parameter κ11.
Suppose Γ = γstd
ACB
+ iΩ, and Γ
j1 j2... jk
i1i2...ik
represents the mi-
nor determinant of order k of Γ. The possible range for
κ11 and κ22, limited by the uncertainty principle, are κ11 ∈
[κ¯11 − Rx, κ¯11 + Rx] and κ22 ∈
[
κ¯22 − Rp, κ¯22 + Rp
]
, where
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FIG. 6. Schematic of the entangling cloner attack. Eve gener-
ates a two-mode squeezed vacuum state, and send one mode to her
quantum memory. She then interacts the other mode with mode B0
using a beamsplitter (BS), whose transmittance equals to the chan-
nel transmittance TC . She will send one mode after the BS to Bob,
and keep the other mode in the quantum memory. After collecting
enough many rounds, Eve will conduct the joint measurement on all
states kept in her quantum memory.
κ¯11 = −φxΓ234124
/
Γ234
234
, κ¯22 = −φpΓ123134
/
Γ134
134
, and
Rx =
(
VBΓ
1234
1234
/
Γ234
234
− φx2
[
Γ124
124
Γ234
234
−
(
Γ234
124
)2]/(
Γ234
234
)2)1/2
Rp =
(
VBΓ
1234
1234
/
Γ134
134
− φp2
[
Γ134
134
Γ123
123
−
(
Γ123
134
)2]/(
Γ134
134
)2)1/2
We note that, even if without these symmetry-induced sim-
plifications, two facts indicate that the general linear searching
algorithms also work effectively for the searching process: 1)
the possible set S κ is a connected set; 2) the sub-additivity
of the secret key rate indicates that usually there is only one
minimum point of the secret key rate .
D. Parameters for the numerical simulation
Here we explain the parameters used for the simulation in
Fig. 3 of the main context. We consider the reverse recon-
ciliation case, and assume that Bob uses homodyne detector.
The reconciliation efficiency is assumed to be 0.95. From the
Fig. 5, we know that generally speaking the smaller the VA is,
the closer the ηA approaches to 1. However, if VA is too small,
its ability to tolerate the channel excess noise will decrease.
Therefore, in the simulation, we choose VA = 3 for 16-QAM,
and VA = 5 for both 64-QAM and 256-QAM.The correspond-
ing ηA are 1−3.7×10−3, 1−1.4×10−4 and ηA = 1−6.5×10−8,
respectively.
To simulate the terms in the sub covariance matrix γCB, we
assume the channel eavesdropping model is the entangling-
cloner attack [23], which is commonly used in the perfor-
mance simulation of one-way CV protocols. We note that
the entangling-cloner attack may not be the optimal attack
for QAM case. The reason we still choose it for the per-
formance simulation is the channel usually behaves like this
way in common experiments. The schematics of this attack is
shown in Fig. 6. Eve generates a two-mode squeezed vacuum
state with variance VE = (1 + TCǫC) / (1 − TC), where ǫC is
the channel excess noise and TC is the channel transmittance.
She first sends one mode to her quantum memory, then inter-
acts the other mode with mode B0 using a beamsplitter (BS),
whose transmittance equals to TC. After this, she will send
one mode after the BS to Bob, and keep the other mode in the
quantum memory. After collecting enough many rounds, Eve
will conduct a joint measurement on all states in her quantum
memory.
For another parameter ηBS , which is the transmittance of
the BS used to split the mode D into modes C and B0. We
choose it to be ηBS = 0.9. This means in our simulation, if
VA = 3, then the variance of ρB0 is 2.8, and if VA = 5, then
the variance of ρB0 is 4.6. Therefore, to compare 256-QAM
with ideal Gaussian case, we keep the variance of the state
incident into the channel being the same, which means the
variance for the ideal Gaussian case is also set to 4.6. Addi-
tionally, we know that different ηBS correspond to different en-
tangled source, which will show different performances. And
the higher the ηBS is, the smaller the VA is. Thus, roughly
speaking, higher ηBS means better the performance. This pa-
rameter can also be optimized according to different channel
conditions, if required.
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